

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION


DWAYNE EMERSON STRICKLAND,  
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Respondent.

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3:17-CV-373-M-BF  
3:00-CR-420-M



**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:

**I. Procedural Background**

Petitioner filed this petition to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On June 26, 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. Petitioner was later released on supervised release. On January 23, 2009, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 18 months in prison, to be served consecutively to a state court sentence. He did not file an appeal.

On February 6, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 petition. He states that he has been rehabilitated during his incarceration. He states he has completed educational, vocational and drug treatment classes. He asks the Court to vacate his sentence.

## **II. Discussion**

### **1. Statute of Limitations**

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas proceedings. *See* ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) ("AEDPA"). The statute provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:

- (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
- (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the Petitioner was prevented from filing by such governmental action;
- (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

*See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

In most cases, the limitations period begins to run when the judgment becomes final. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Petitioner's revocation became final on February 6, 2009, when the time for filing an appeal expired. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (providing fourteen days to file an appeal in criminal cases) (West 2009). Petitioner then had one year, or until February 6, 2010, to file his § 2255 petition. Petitioner did not file his petition until February 6, 2017. His petition is therefore untimely.

## **2. Equitable Tolling**

The one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling in "rare and exceptional cases." *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); *see also Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must "examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling" (quoting *Davis*, 158 F.3d at 811)). The Fifth Circuit has held that " '[e]quitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.' " *Coleman v. Johnson*, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting *Rashidi v. Am. President Lines*, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1996)). Movant bears the burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. *Phillips v. Donnelly*, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has failed to allege he was actively misled about his habeas remedies or that he was prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights. He has failed to show rare and exceptional circumstances justifying equitable tolling in this case.


## **3. Rehabilitation**

Petitioner seeks to vacate his sentence based on his rehabilitation. Such a claim is not cognizable under § 2255. *See United States v. Hatten*, 167 F.3d 884, 887 n.5 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) ("Relief under § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional law and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.") (citing *United States v. Vaughn*, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). The petitions should therefore be dismissed.

### **III. Recommendation**

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the petition to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be dismissed.

Signed this 13 day of October, 2017.



PAUL D. STICKNEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).